SHERIFF'S DEED PROPERTY DESC. APPROVAL FORM. November 04, 2005 (2024)

Case

THIRD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN VS PATRICIA D PERRY

Aug 28, 2024 |KELLY MCLAUGHLIN |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3741

Case

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, SUCCESSO VS THOMAS W. COMMAGER

Aug 29, 2024 |SUSAN BAKER ROSS |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3755

Case

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF AMERICA VS JESSICA FISK

Aug 29, 2024 |JENNIFER D. TOWELL |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3746

Case

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONALTRUST COMPANY, AS VS UNKNOWN ADMINISTRATOR, EXECUTOR OR FIDUC

Case

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION VS TAMICA J MOSLEY

Case

CITIZENS BANK, NA VS BEVERLY M. GWIN

Aug 27, 2024 |SUSAN BAKER ROSS |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3721

Case

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC VS COY GIBBONS

Case

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER VS TIMOTHY J FALOR

Aug 26, 2024 |CHRISTINE CROCE |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3688

Case

Aug 28, 2024 |SUSAN BAKER ROSS |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3737

Ruling

NADIA KAMEL ALJOJO VS ADNAN ALJOJO

Aug 29, 2024 |22STCV09355

Case Number: 22STCV09355 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Nadia Kamel Salem, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22STCV09355 vs. Tentative Ruling Adnan Mohamed Aljojo, Amwest Funding Corp., and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens Moving Party: Defendant Adnan Aljojo Responding Party: Plaintiff Nadia Kamel Salem T/R: THE MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS IS DENIED. DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS DENIED. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,650.00. DEFENDANT TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND On April 21, 2022, Plaintiff Nadia Kamel Salem filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants Adnan Mohamed Aljojo; and Amwest Funding Corp., for cancellation of written instrument by fraud in factum and non-delivery. On July 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. Plaintiffs earlier lis pendens had been vacated because Plaintiff failed to comply with certain rules. Defendant Aljojo now moves for an order expunging the lis pendens. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendant Aljojos requests for judicial notice are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code Sections 452, subdivision (d) and 453, as to the existence of the documents, but not as to the truth of the matters in them. ANALYSIS When a motion to expunge a lis pendens is filed, the burden is on the opposing party to show that the complaint contains allegations of a real-property claim, and to show the probable validity of the claim, based on a preponderance of evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.32, 405.31, 405.30; Howard S. Wright Construction Co. v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 314, 319.) [T]he court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of expunging the notice if the court finds the claimant has not established the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.) A. Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens Defendant Aljojo moves to expunge the lis pendens recorded by Plaintiff on July 9, 2024, concerning 600 N. Plymouth Blvd/5421 Clinton Street, Los Angeles, CA 90004. Aljojo contends Plaintiff cannot show the probable validity of her real property claim, and that Plaintiff failed to comply with the service and filing requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 405.22. Aljojo contends Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations because the purported fraudulent transfer of the Property by Plaintiff to Aljojo occurred in January 2016 and Plaintiff knew or suspected the fraud in 2017. Aljojo also asserts that the 2017 eviction proceeding he filed against Plaintiffs son (Aljojos brother) put Plaintiff on notice five years before filing this action. Aljojo argues that title to the Property is in his name, which is prima facie evidence of his title. Likewise, Aljojo contends in August 2017, Plaintiff provided two videos admitting in Arabic that the property belongs to him. And Aljojo argues that the U.S. Vice Consul would have explained the nature and consequences of the document to be notarized to Plaintiff. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Aljojos deposition testimony demonstrates he forged documents on her behalf without her knowledge or consent. Plaintiff submits declarations from persons purporting to have witnessed Aljojos acts of fraud. Plaintiff asserts that the Court previously adopted the five-year statute of limitations period for cancellation of deed. Plaintiff points to the Courts denial of the motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of material fact concerning her delayed discovery. Plaintiff contends she was not aware of the 2017 demand letter, nor of the existence of the deed transferring the Property until 2022. And Plaintiff contends equitable estoppel bars the statute of limitations defense because Aljojo coerced her into recording a video where she made misleading statements that she did not fully understand. The Court finds that the evidence presented by Plaintiff, including but not limited to Aljojos deposition testimony, supporting declarations from other family members, and Plaintiffs own declaration, are sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of her real property claim. The proof of service attached to the Notice of Lis Pendens indicates it was served on all parties on July 8, 2024. Aljojos Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is DENIED. B. Request for Attorneys Fees The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorneys fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorneys fees and costs unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.) Plaintiff seeks $6,650.00 in attorney fees, for (1) 11.5 hours reviewing the motion, preparing the opposition and supporting papers and (2) an anticipated 2.5 hours reviewing the reply and preparing for and attending the hearing, at an hourly rate of $475.00 per hour. These are reasonable. Aljojo has not shown he was substantially justified in bringing this motion; nor has Aljojo shown any other reason that imposing attorneys fees would be unjust. Defendants request for attorneys fees is DENIED. Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees is GRANTED in the amount of $6,650.00.

Ruling

JENNIFER JOHNSON VS SIMONE BELLINGER, ET AL.

Sep 03, 2024 |22STCV32796

Case Number: 22STCV32796 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING JENNIFER JOHNSON, vs. SIMONE BELLINGER, et al. Case No.: 22STCV32796 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 The Court denies Plaintiffs default judgment packet. The Court sets a hearing on an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed and/or Plaintiffs counsel sanctioned $250 for failing to enter default judgment (California Rule of Court, rule 3.110(h)) on November 7, 2024, at 8:30 AM in Department 71 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse for the following reasons: 1. No request for court judgment (CIV-100). 2. No proposed judgment (JUD-100). 3. No DOEs dismissal. 4. The address listed on the proof of personal service for Aaron J. Byrd and Robert Byrd, Jr., is incorrect. The address should read, 13003 Ruthelen Street Apt 1, Gardena, CA 90249. 5. The prayer for damages in the Complaint does not specify the amount of damages claimed. (See, e.g., Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830-831 [court acts in excess of its jurisdiction and the resulting default judgment is void if the court awards default judgment in an amount greater than that demanded in the complaint, including if the complaint does not specify the amount demanded].)

Ruling

MAHRT vs Cornerstone et al

Aug 30, 2024 |SCV-270601

SCV-270601, MAHRT v. Cornerstone et al. RLI’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. The demurrer to the first cause of action isSUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The demurrer to the second cause of action isSUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed from case no. SCV-270601. It will proceed under thecaption David Macario DBA Macario Insurance Group v. RLI Insurance Company, Moes 1 through 50,inclusive, with a new case number to be assigned by the clerk. RLI’s counsel is directed to prepare a written order consistent with this tentative ruling andcompliant with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.I. Factual background In July 2021, Garry and Gillian Mahrt (collectively “Plaintiffs”) entered into an agreement topurchase a 158-acre ranch for $2.6 million. Defendant Cornerstone Land Co. (“Cornerstone”) was the realestate broker representing both Plaintiffs and the seller in the transaction. On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffswired the full purchase price according to transfer instructions they had received by email purporting to befrom Gabriel Foster (“Foster”), an agent with Cornerstone. Unfortunately, the email was a fraud sent bydefendant Yang Liu, one of the principals of defendant CASL International, who had hacked into computersin California and learned enough about Plaintiffs’ upcoming real estate transaction to enable him to createthe fraudulent email. As a result, Plaintiffs’ $2.6 million went into CASL’s account at defendant JPMorganChase Bank, from which it has since been withdrawn. Cross-complainant David Macario (“Macario”) was Cornerstone’s insurance broker. Cross-defendant RLI Insurance (“RLI”) was Cornerstone’s errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurer, a relationshipthat began in 2018. On August 17, 2021, Cornerstone, with Macario’s assistance, filled out an applicationto renew the E&O policy for the twelve months beginning on September 17, 2021. Question 9 on theapplication asked whether Cornerstone had “any knowledge of any incident, a circ*mstance, an event, orunresolved fee dispute that may result in a claim.” Cornerstone responded “no.” The application also statedthat if Cornerstone learned of any information that would change that answer prior to the effective date ofthe coverage, September 17, 20201, Cornerstone would notify RLI in writing of that information. Macariosent the renewal application to RLI on August 18, 2021. RLI alleges that Plaintiffs informed Cornerstone of their loss on August 20, 2021, that Cornerstonenotified Macario of the loss on August 23, that Plaintiffs’ attorney informed Cornerstone of an investigationinto the loss on December 6, and that on or about December 15, Macario instructed Macario to file a formalclaim with RLI. However, Cornerstone first apprised RLI of the loss on March 15, 2022. On April 29 andagain on May 12, RLI denied coverage on the basis that Cornerstone had failed to inform them of Plaintiffs’potential claim prior to the beginning of the coverage period on September 17, 2021.II. Procedural background The underlying lawsuit was initiated on April 14, 2022, when Plaintiffs filed a complaint againstCornerstone, Foster, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Yang Liu, and several other entities. On October 5, 2023, RLI sued Cornerstone in the Eastern District federal court, RLI Insurance v.Cornerstone (no. 2:23-cv-02265), seeking rescission of the 2021-2022 insurance policy on the grounds ofCornerstone’s misrepresentation that did not know of any pending claims. On December 19, 2023, Cornerstone cross-complained in the case at bar against Macario forprofessional negligence for failing to notify RLI of the potential claim when he became aware of it, and forequitable indemnity. On March 8, 2024, Macario filed a cross-complaint (“Cross-complaint”) against RLI for declaratoryrelief and equitable indemnity. RLI demurred to the Cross-complaint on June 4, 2024, and moved, in thealternative to sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, for severance of Macario’s cross-action fromthe underlying lawsuit. This matter comes on calendar for hearing on that motion.III. Judicial notice RLI requests judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint, Cornerstone’s cross-complaint againstMacario, Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI, and RLI’s complaint against Cornerstone in the EasternDistrict federal court. The request is granted pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).IV. Demurrer A. Governing law A demurrer tests whether the complaint sufficiently states a valid cause of action. (Hahn v. Merda(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Complaints are read as a whole, in context, and are liberallyconstrued. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts accept as true all material factsproperly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, conclusions of fact or law, the construction ofinstruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81Cal.App.4th 39, 43; see also South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.)Matters which may be judicially noticed are also considered. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584,591.) If a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted where the complaint’s defect can becured by amendment. (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 852.) A court abusesits discretion by denying leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff canstate a valid cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) However, “[l]eave toamend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but noliability exists under substantive law.” (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint can be amended, and how that amendment willchange the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman, supra, at p. 349.) B. First cause of action: declaratory relief In the Cross-complaint, Macario seeks “a declaration that [RLI is] obliged to indemnify the actionherein on behalf of [Cornerstone], and [Cornerstone] has a present right to receive a defense from [RLI].”(Cross-complaint, Prayer ¶ 1.) That is, in his first cause of action, Macario seeks this Court’s declarationthat RLI is required to honor the terms of its insurance policy with Cornerstone, despite not having beentimely informed of Plaintiffs’ potential claim against Cornerstone. “Any person interested . . . under a contract [may] bring an original action . . . for a declaration ofhis rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validityarising under such instrument or contract.” (CCP § 1060.) RLI argues that Macario lacks standing toseek this relief because he is not a party to the insurance policy under which he seeks to compel RLI’sperformance, and therefore not “interested . . . under the contract.” The Court agrees that a non-party to acontract lacks standing to seek a declaration of rights under that contract. (See, e.g., Fladeboe v.American Isuzu Motors (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 55; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.)Macario argues in response that has standing to seek declaratory relief because he was paid a commissionfor brokering the policy and is therefore a third-party beneficiary of it, and therefore has standing to sue toenforce it. (Oppo at pp. 5-6.) A third party may bring a cause of action on a contract only when three conditions are met: thethird party would in fact benefit from the contract; “a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was toprovide a benefit to the third party”; and “permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contractaction against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonableexpectations of the contracting parties.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) “Allthree elements must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.” (Ibid.) The contract at issue here, the insurance policy issued by insurer RLI for the benefit of insuredCornerstone, appears as Exhibit B to Exhibit D of RLI’s request for judicial notice. Nothing about itsuggests that a motivating purpose of RLI and Cornerstone was to provide Macario with a commission.Macario avers that “the contract explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration.”(Oppo at p. 6.) Macario does not point out where in the contract that explicit inclusion is to be found, andit is not obvious to the Court. Nothing in the policy mentions a commission, or payment to a broker forarranging the policy, or anything along those lines. RLI’s response to Macario’s contention that thepolicy “explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration” is that “It does no suchthing.” (Reply at p. 2, fn. 1.) The Court sees no basis to disagree with that assessment. Moreover, even if Macario were a third-party beneficiary, his ability to enforce the policy wouldextend only to the benefits he stood to receive. A third party suing on a contract “bears the burden ofproving that the promise he seeks to enforce was actually made to him personally or to a class of which heis a member.” (Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 348-349.) If the policy contained aprovision that Macario was to be paid a commission – which, again, it does not – Macario could sue tocollect that commission if it was not paid, but he would still not be entitled to sue to enforce a promisemade by one of the contracting parties to the other one, because that would be a promise not made to himpersonally. The demurrer is sustained with respect to the first cause of action. Since Macario could notpossibly allege anything that would change the fact that he is not a party to the contract he seeks toenforce, leave to amend is denied. C. Second cause of action: equitable indemnity The principle of equitable indemnity “permit[s] the equitable sharing of loss between multipletortfeasors.” (American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 597; GemDevelopers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 426.) The operative wordis “tortfeasors.” Equitable indemnity is a tort concept. Cornerstone is suing Macario for professionalnegligence, so there is no question that he is alleged to be a tortfeasor. (RJN, Exh. B at p. 9.) Thequestion, then, is whether RLI is a joint tortfeasor; that is, whether Cornerstone’s damages, which consistof exposure to potential liability for Plaintiffs’ claims with no insurance coverage, are caused by RLI’stortious conduct, in addition to Macario’s alleged tortious conduct. RLI’s argument, in summary, is thatRLI cannot possibly be a joint tortfeasor because its relationship with Cornerstone is based purely oncontract, specifically on the insurance policy. Macario argues that his “involvement in the alleged wrongful acts, including misrepresentation ofthe Policy requirements, when combined with RLI’s subsequent actions denying coverage, does establisha basis for tort liability.” (Oppo at p. 10.) He does not explain how it establishes that. However, thesecond paragraph in the equitable indemnity cause of action comes close: “Therefore, CROSS-COMPLAINANT would be entitled to complete or partial equitable indemnity from CROSS-DEFENDANTS if the damages and relief claimed are covered under the any [sic] policy issued byCROSS-DEFENDANT.” It is possible for an insurer to wrongfully deny coverage and incur only liabilityfor breach of contract; if that were the situation, RLI’s (hypothetical) wrongful action would not makeRLI a joint tortfeasor, and RLI could, therefore, not be liable for equitable indemnity. However, if RLI’sdenial of coverage were not only wrongful, and not only breach of contract, but also a tort, then RLIwould arguably be a joint tortfeasor. An insurer’s denial of coverage can be a tort if it is done in bad faith. “An insurer is said to act in‘bad faith’ when it not only breaches its policy contract but also breaches its implied covenant to dealfairly and in good faith with its insured.” (Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062,1071.) “When the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, itis subject to liability in tort.” (Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 214-215.) Thus, in theory, Macario and RLI could be joint tortfeasors if Cornerstone’s injury resulted from acombination of Macario’s professional negligence and RLI’s bad faith denial of Cornerstone’s claim.(See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1078.) Since the second cause of action incorrectly alleges that Macario would be entitled to equitableindemnity from RLI in the case of any wrongful denial of coverage, the demurrer is sustained as to thatcause of action. However, leave to amend is granted. Macario may amend the second cause of action toallege that he would be entitled to equitable indemnity if RLI is found to have denied Cornerstone’s claimin bad faith. The Court takes no position on whether Macario could prove such an allegation, but thatquestion does not arise at the demurrer stage.V. Severance of the cross-action A. RLI is not an appropriate party to this lawsuit “Generally an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the underlying action against theinsured by the injured third party. The fact that an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for anyjudgment rendered in the action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not acontract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the insurer directly.” (Royal SurplusLines Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 200, citing Rutter Group, Cal. PracticeGuide: Insurance Litigation ¶ 15.11.) This principle springs from Evid. Code § 1155, which provides thatevidence that a defendant was insured at the time of an injury “is inadmissible to prove negligence orother wrongdoing.” RLI argues that this principle requires the Court to either sustain the instant demurrerwithout leave to amend or sever Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI from the case at bar. The Court agrees. The point of this rule is to avoid the trial of a personal injury action and anaction against the defendant’s insurer before the same jury, because in such a trial, “the fact of [thedefendant’s] liability insurance would . . . be disclosed to the jury which would be determining the issuesinvolved, a circ*mstance which is generally held a matter of prejudice.” (State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v.Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432.) The holding to which the court referred became a statutoryrule when Evid. Code § 1155 took effect in 1967. “A joint trial against the insured for negligence andagainst the insurer for violating its duties under [Ins. Code § 790.03(h), which prohibits unfair claimssettlement practices] would obviously violate both the letter and spirit of [Evid. Code § 1155].” (RoyalGlobe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891.) Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (1988)46 Cal.3d 287 overruled Royal Globe on the issue of whether there is a private cause of action againstinsurers for unfair settlement practices, but cited the above-quoted passage from Royal Globe withapproval as authority for sustaining the insurer’s demurrer. (Id. at p. 306.) In State Farm, supra, the insurer brought a declaratory relief action against its insured, Collins,seeking a determination of whether the automobile accident in which Collins had been involved wascovered by the policy. (State Farm, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 430.) While that action was pending, severalpeople who had been involved in the accident sued Collins. (Ibid.) The trial court consolidated theactions, resulting in a case involving both a tort action against Collins and a coverage action betweenCollins and the insurer. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that the consolidation was an abuse of discretionand ordered the two actions severed. (Id. at p. 433.) In Royal Globe, supra, the plaintiff sued both thefood market where she had fallen and its insurer. (Royal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884.) Althoughthe Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that “a third party claimant may sue an insurer” for violationsof the statute prohibiting unfair claims practices, it held that such a lawsuit must be separate from thepersonal injury action against the claimant. (Ibid.; again, the former holding was subsequently overturnedby Moradi-Shalal, supra.) The situation here differs slightly. State Farm and Royal Globe both involved a single individualwho was the defendant in the underlying tort action and also engaged in a dispute with the insurerregarding his own coverage (as a plaintiff in the case of Royal Globe and as a defendant in the case ofState Farm). Here, in contrast, the cross-defendant in the cross-action for malpractice, Macario, has suedthe insurer, RLI, over its coverage of someone else, the cross-complainant Cornerstone. That would be acrucial distinction if the cross-action were the entire lawsuit. The evil that the rule under discussion seeksto avoid is a jury learning that a defendant has insurance coverage, which Evid. Code § 1155 forbids thejury from knowing. All the jury would learn at a trial of the cross-action is that Cornerstone has insurancecoverage, which could not prejudice them in favor of granting damages to Cornerstone and againstMacario since Cornerstone would not be a party. However, the cross-action is not the entire lawsuit. The case at bar is, at its core, an action by theMahrts against Cornerstone. That is, in addition to being a cross-complainant, Cornerstone is also adefendant. Therefore, under Evid. Code § 1155, the jury is not permitted to know that Cornerstone hasinsurance that might arguably cover the plaintiffs’ damages, even under the circ*mstance that the insurerdisputes coverage. If this lawsuit proceeds as currently structured, the jury would inevitably learn that.Therefore, RLI is not an appropriate party. B. The authorities cited by Macario are not to the contrary. Macario states that his “situation is distinguishable because his claim involves professionnegligence and the need for equitable indemnity,” and that his “claims against RLI involve allegations ofprofessional negligence and the handling of the insurance claim.” (Oppo at pp. 12, 13.) (To be clear, it isCornerstone’s claim against Macario that involves allegations of professional negligence.) As authorityfor the proposition that these facts change anything, Macario cites to Otay Land Co. v. Royal IndemnityCo. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, characterizing it as an example of “situations where insurers have beenincluded due to their significant involvement in the underlying issues.” (Oppo at p. 13.) In Otay, theinsurer was included because it was the defendant: Otay is a simple two-party lawsuit by an insuredagainst its insurer for a declaratory judgment regarding coverage. (Id. at p. 558.) It does not address theissue presented here of an insurer and its insured both being sued by someone else in the same lawsuit. Macario also asserts that “[t]his almost precise scenario was presented in” Royal Surplus, supra,100 Cal.App.4th 193. (Oppo at p. 14.) “Almost precise” is not the same as “precise”; Royal Surpluscomes somewhat closer than Otay to being on point, but is distinguishable on its facts. There, a generalcontractor and its insurer (respectively Ocean and Royal Surplus) sued a subcontractor and its insurer(respectively Ultimate and Ranger) for indemnity after tenants of an apartment complex built by Ocean,with framing work done by Ultimate, sued Ocean over habitability issues. (Id. at pp. 196-197.) The trialcourt “sustained Ranger’s demurrer without leave to amend solely on the ground of misjoinder in that itwas improper to name both the insured and insurer in the same action.” (Id. at p. 198.) That is, the trialcourt dismissed the case on the same grounds upon which RLI urges this Court to dismiss Macario’scross-complaint. The reviewing court reversed. However, the reason for the reversal was that Ocean and Ultimatehad an explicit indemnification agreement “that required Ultimate to defend and indemnify Ocean forclaims arising out of Ultimate’s work,” and also required Ocean to be named as an additional insured onUltimate’s policy with Ranger. (Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.) Therefore, this wasnot a so-called third-party case where an injured party sues both the party that injured him and that party’sinsurer; it was a first-party case where an injured party sued its own insurer, which is what Ranger waswith respect to Ocean under the indemnification agreement. (Id. at p. 200 [“If Ocean is an additionalinsured, then it is a first party”].) No such agreement exists here. In contrast to Royal Surplus, this is purely a third-party actionwhere a party (Macario) not in contractual privity with the insurer (RLI) is contesting the insurer’scoverage decision regarding a third party (Cornerstone). Thus, Royal Surplus does not contradict RLI’sargument that it will be severely prejudiced, in precisely the manner Evid. Code § 1155 is intended toprevent, if it is forced to litigate RLI’s claim in the same case as the Mahrts’ action against RLI’s insuredCornerstone. Finally, Macario avers that in Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d1266, “the court acknowledged that insurers could be included in actions where their involvement in theunderlying issues was significant.” (Oppo at p. 15.) Omaha involves a lawsuit by landlords againsttenants who had damaged the landlords’ rental property, as well as against Omaha, the tenants’ insurer.(Id. at p. 1269.) Omaha demurred on the basis that the tenants “were not parties to the contract ofinsurance and, therefore, had no standing to pursue a claim for declaratory relief.” (Id. at pp. 1269-1270.)(That is, on the same basis upon which RLI demurs to Macario’s first cause of action.) The trial courtoverruled the demurrer; correctly, as the reviewing court determined, because just as in Royal Surplus, theinsurance policy was “for the mutual benefit of landlord and tenant.” (Id. at p. 1269.) Therefore thelandlords were “the intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy. . . . In such instances, an action fordeclaratory relief is appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 1269, 1270.) However, this did not satisfy Omaha, which insisted that despite being in contractual privity withthe landlords, “it would suffer prejudice should the lawsuit against both itself and the [tenants] goforward.” (Omaha, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1270.) As RLI has done here, Omaha had moved in thetrial court, as an alternative to sustaining their demurrer, to sever the declaratory relief action against themfrom the tort lawsuit against the tenants. (Ibid.) The trial court had denied that motion. After severallitigation maneuvers not relevant here, the reviewing court agreed that the actions needed to be severed inorder to avoid prejudice to Omaha, and issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to grant themotion to sever. (Id. at p. 1275.) As with Royal Surplus, the reviewing court’s ruling on the demurrer was based on the point thatthis was a first-party lawsuit; that is, that the plaintiffs were in contractual privity with the insurer. Again,that is not the situation here. However, as discussed next, the Omaha’s holding that “the trial courtabused its discretion when it denied Omaha’s motion to sever,” is highly relevant here. (Omaha, supra,209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1271.) C. Macario’s cross-complaint for equitable indemnity is severed from the underlying action. “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will beconducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a causeof action asserted in a cross-complaint.” (CCP § 1048(b).) “[A] complaint and a cross-complaint are, formost purposes, treated as independent actions. [Citations.] It is within the discretion of the court to ordera severance and separate trials of such actions [citations], and the exercise of such discretion will not beinterfered with on appeal except when there has been a manifest abuse thereof.” (McLellan v. McLellan(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 353, citing McArthur v. Shaffer (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 724, 727.) RLI requests that in the event the Court does not dismiss Macario’s cross-complaint altogether, itsever the cross-action from the underlying lawsuit by the Mahrts against RLI’s insured Cornerstone.(MPA at pp. 18-19; Reply at p. 9.) Macario expresses a preference for proceeding in the current action,but provides no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to do so. (Oppo at p. 15.) His commentthat “without the inclusion of RLI in this action, there is . . . the possibility that the rights of Macario maybe essentially adjudicated in a proceeding in which he is not a participant (i.e. – the federal court action)”presumably refers to the point that his cause of action for declaratory relief in the instant case is anattempt to resolve the same question that is before the Eastern District in the RLI Insurance v. Cornerstonecase: whether the RLI/Cornerstone insurance policy is active and enforceable. But as discussed above, thatis between RLI and Cornerstone irrespective of what court it is litigated in or who else is a party to thelitigation. The Court agrees that the severance RLI requests is the best way to permit Macario to go forwardwith an action for equitable indemnity without prejudicing RLI by disclosing to the Mahrt v. Cornerstonejury that it is Cornerstone’s insurer. (Evid. Code § 1155.) Accordingly, the Court orders that Macario’scross-complaint against RLI be severed, and proceed as a separate lawsuit.VI. Conclusion The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer to thesecond cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed.

Ruling

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES vs. CONEY ISLAND FARMS, INC.

Aug 21, 2024 |C24-01489

C24-01489 CASE NAME: STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES VS. CONEY ISLAND FARMS, INC. HEARING ON PETITION IN RE: FOR ORDER PERMITTING ENTRY AND INVESTIGATION OF REAL PROPERTY FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Petitioner, the State of California, by and through the Department of Water Resources, filed a petition for order permitting entry and investigation of real property against Respondent, Coney Island Farms, Inc. No opposition has been filed. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted. Background: On June 7, 2024, Petitioner, the State of California, by and through the Department of Water Resources filed a petition for order permitting entry and investigation of real property against Respondent Coney Island Farms, Inc. Petitioner seeks access to real property in Contra Costa County, Assessor Parcel Numbers (APNs) 001-111-004 and 001-111-005. (Initial Petition, 6:10–12.) Petitioner requests access to the subject properties for 11 intermittent 12-hour days for a period of 12 months in order to conduct geological surveys and tests, as well as biologic and cultural site clearances and surveys. (Id. at 6:11–20.) For geological matters, Petitioner intends to make five soil borings, conduct Cone Penetrometer Tests (CPT), and collect groundwater. The soil borings will be approximately three and eight inches in diameter, to a maximum depth of 250 feet. (Declaration of Allan T. Davis, 3:2–5.) The holes will be backfilled and sealed in the method most suited for the local environment, likely bentonite grout. (Id. at 7; Declaration of Andrew Finney, 4:7.) CPT is a cone-tipped rod with a diameter of one to two inches, pushed through the ground to measure tip resistance, side friction, and several other values. (Declaration of Andrew Finney, 4:3–4.) The groundwater will be sampled from existing wells, and the amount removed from the property owners well will not exceed 3 gallons. (Id. at 4:17–19.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 08/21/2024The biological site clearances and surveys are conducted to support the above-mentioned soilinvestigations. (Declaration of Katherine Marquez ¶ 5.) Site clearances occur in the immediate areawhere the soil investigations would happen. (Id. at ¶ 6.) The cultural studies include archeologicalhistoric surveys of the area and offer tribal representatives an opportunity to survey for tribalresources. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The study consists of a review of the California Historical ResourcesInformation System records and a walking survey for various resources. (Ibid.)Legal Standard:Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just compensation,ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner. TheLegislature may provide for possession by the condemnor following the commencement of eminentdomain proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined bythe court to be the probable amount of just compensation. (Cal Const, Art. 1 § 19(a).)Analysis:The precondemnation entry and testing statutes under California Eminent Domain law control thesubject matter. (CCP § 1245.010-1245.030.) Subject to requirements of these articles, any personauthorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may enter upon property tomake photographs, studies, surveys, examinations, tests, soundings, borings, samplings, or appraisalsor to engage in similar activities reasonably related to acquisition or use of the property for that use.(CCP § 1245.010.) Before making that entry and undertaking those activities, the person shallsecure at least one of the following: (a) the written consent of the owner to enter upon theowner's property and to undertake those activities; or (b) an order for entry from the superior court.(CCP § 1245.020.)The person seeking to enter upon the property may petition the court for an order permitting theentry and shall give such prior notice to the owner of the property as the court determines isappropriate under the circ*mstances of the particular case. Upon such petition and after such noticehas been given, the court shall determine the purpose for the entry, the nature and scope of theactivities reasonably necessary to accomplish such purpose, and the probable amount ofcompensation to be paid to the owner of the property for the actual damage to the property andinterference with its possession and use. After such determination, the court may issue its orderpermitting the entry. The order shall prescribe the purpose for the entry and the nature and scope ofthe activities to be undertaken and shall require the person seeking to enter to deposit with the courtthe probable amount of compensation. (CCP § 1245.030.)In the controlling case, Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held thatthe State of California may use precondemnation proceedings to authorize entry on specific parcels ofreal property to conduct specified geological, environmental, and cultural activities. ((2016) 1 Cal. 5th151, 177.) The court held the California takings clause was satisfied if the statute was reformed toallow the property owner to obtain a jury determination of damages if the property owner so SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 08/21/2024chooses, however, damages are limited to actual damage resulting from entry and testing. (Id. at167.) In addition, the court concluded a hearing and an opportunity to be heard on a public entity’sentry petition are implicit in the statutory scheme. (Id. at 175.)Petitioner is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for state waterand subterranean testing, pursuant to Water Code sections 250, 11577, 11580, and Part 11, Division3, Title 2 of the Government Code.As required by statute, Petitioner filed a court petition and served notice upon Respondent.Petitioner states the purpose for entry is to investigate both: “. . . the best alternative and futurewater conversion and conveyance facilities in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta necessary to restoreand protect reliable water deliveries and supplies for fisheries, habitat and other water users inCalifornia;” and “. . . the potential impacts of a water conveyance system. . .” on various resources onthe subject properties. (Initial Petition, 4:20, 5:3–5.)As provided in statute by CCP section 1245.010, the nature and scope of the activities are reasonablynecessary to accomplish the purpose listed in the above paragraph. (Id. at 4:19–23.) Petitioner arguesthe probable compensation of activities reasonably necessary is $7500. If Respondent wishes todispute this amount, they are entitled to a jury determination of actual damages, in accordance withthe California Supreme Court’s holding in Property Reserve. (1 Cal. 5th, 151, 167.)All necessary components of the entry and testing precondemnation statutory scheme have beenlisted and met. As such, the State of California, by and through the Department of Water Resourceshas properly petitioned this court, and the petition is granted.Disposition:The California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve allows the California State Department ofWater to utilize the entry and testing precondemnation statutory scheme with some modifications.(Id. at 213.)Petitioner shall file a proposed order by September 29, 2024.

Ruling

RIDERWOOD USA INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS JL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 26, 2024 |23AHCV01961

Case Number: 23AHCV01961 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: August 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: RIDERWOOD USA INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, vs. JL Investment Group, Inc., a California corporation dba Baja Cali Fish & Tacos; Bibigo International LLC, a California limited liability company; CJ America, Inc., a New York corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. CASE NO.: 23AHCV01961 MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT MOVING PARTY: Defendant JL Investment Group, Inc. (JLIG) RESPONDING PARTY: Riderwood USA Inc. SERVICE: Filed July 9, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed August 9, 2024 REPLY: Filed August 19, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant JLIG moves to set aside the default entered on October 26, 2023 based on improper service (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d)) and attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and neglect of JLIGs general counsel Tricia Wilson (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) BACKGROUND Defendant was the final tenant of a commercial space. The complaint alleges Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, as landlord, and the original tenant, Bibigo International, entered a lease on or about April 7, 2016. On October 16, 2019, the landlord and tenants entered an assignment, assumption and consent agreement where the lease was assigned from Bibigo International to JLIG. CJ America guaranteed the lease. Plaintiff currently is the landlord under the lease and guaranty, and alleged all Defendants failed and refused to make the rent payments under the lease. Attached to the complaint is the lease as Exhibit A and the guaranty as Exhibit B. Plaintiff brought this action for breach of lease and breach of guaranty. TENTATIVE RULING JL Investment Group, Inc.s motion to set aside the default is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d).) Generally, defendants have six months from entry of judgment to move to vacate. (Code Civ. Proc §473(b).) But, if the judgment is void on its face, then the six month limit set by section 473 to make other motions to vacate a judgment does not apply. (National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 410, 414.) Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) allows the court to set aside a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding against the moving party based on that partys mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) The motion to set aside must be accompanied by a copy of the proposed pleading to be filed therein. (Ibid.) The discretionary relief provision allows the trial court to set aside a default or a default judgment caused by a party's "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) The application for such relief must "be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken." (Ibid.) DISCUSSION On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff requested, and the court entered, default against Defendant. Plaintiff has not submitted an application for entry of default judgment, so default judgment has not yet been entered in this matter. Defendant now seeks an order setting aside the default under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473(d) and (b). Defendant contends it is entitled to relief for three reasons. First, under section 473(d) because service was improper. Second, under section 473(b) because of attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and neglect. Third, because public policy favors setting aside default and allowing Defendant to answer. The court addresses each argument in turn. First, the Court finds that Defendant has not demonstrated entitlement to the requested relief under section 473(d). Section 473(d) provides, in relevant part, that [t]he court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d).) Defendant is correct that the court has the power to set aside entry of a default which is valid on its face yet void as a matter of law owing to improper service. See Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1199; Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4th 540, 544. In this case, however, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff did not effectuate proper substitute service of the summons and Complaint. It is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits. Appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order when the result is to compel a trial on the merits than when the default judgment is allowed to stand. [Citation.] Therefore, when a party in default moves promptly to seek relief, very slight evidence is required to justify a trial courts order setting aside a default. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.) Even in a case where the showing & is not strong, or where there is any doubt as to setting aside of a default, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the application. (Rosenthal v. Garner (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 891, 898.) In this case, Defendant claims it was not properly served with Plaintiffs summons and complaint. Plaintiff filed a proof of service on October 18, 2023. According to the proof of service, registered process server J. Martinez served JLIG by substitute service. Substitute service is authorized both for individual defendants and for entity defendants (corporations, partnerships, public entities, etc.). (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(a)-(b).) However, the big difference in using substitute service for individual, as opposed to entity, defendants is that a good faith effort at personal service must first be attempted (i.e., there must be a showing that the summons cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the individual defendant). (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b).) Section 415.20(b) provides: If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the persons dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. Section 415.20 allows substitute service on a business to be served on the first attempt by leaving a copy with anyone apparently in charge of the business or at a mailing address; and thereafter mailing additional copies to the defendant within 10 days. The Court finds Defendants motion for improper service is untimely. Here, the Proof of Service indicates substitute service was performed on September 15, 2023 at 12:09 pm at 2001 W. Valley Blvd., Alhambra, California. On the same day, the process server mailed copies of the documents to Defendant at the place where the copies were left. Although Defendant argue that the person substitute served, Mariah, was just a cashier and not able to accept anything from the process server, the Court finds that she was a person apparently in charge of Defendant at Defendants place of business. (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b).) Therefore, substitute service was properly completed and Defendant cannot seek relief under section 473(d). Second, the Court finds that Defendant has not demonstrated entitlement to the requested relief under section 473(b). Section 473(b) provides, in relevant part, that [t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall . . . be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) Here, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that her failure to file an answer or otherwise plead to the complaint was a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The evidence shows that Plaintiff effectuated proper substitute service upon Defendant on September 15, 2023. While Plaintiff commenced this action on August 25, 2023 and Defendants general counsel, Tricia Wilson, did not become aware of this lawsuit until after JLIG received the clerks entry of default in the mail (the Wilson Declaration does not specify what date she became aware of the action). (Wilson Decl. ¶ 3.) Wilson did not believe she needed to respond to the complaint because she was working with Plaintiff to settle the matter. (Wilson Decl. ¶ 4.) After several attempts to settle, it is apparent to JLIG that an early settlement is no longer feasible. (Ibid.) Due to Wilsons mistaken belief that the case could be settled quickly, JLIG did not move to quash service of summons or request to set aside the default until now. (Ibid.) In opposition, Plaintiffs counsel David Cohen declares that he attempted to discuss settlement with the defendants in mid-August 2023 which led nowhere. (Cohen Decl. ¶ 3.) On August 28, 2023, three days after the complaint was filed, Cohen asked Wilson if she was authorized to accept service of process and Wilson called him the following day to indicate she was not authorized. (Cohen Decl. ¶ 4.) Cohen declares that he told Wilson that he already filed the complaint. (Ibid.) The Cohen Declaration attaches an email from Wilson on September 11, 2023, stating I have forwarded all our correspondences to Mr. Alvarez. He has given me the authority to let you know that they are not in a financial position to defend this lawsuit at the moment, but plan to be in touch with you. (Cohen Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs counsel has successfully established that Defendants counsel Wilson was aware of the suit by including a true and correct copy of Wilsons September 11 email message. Wilsons declaration does not demonstrate that she nor JLIG diligently attempted to settle the dispute. Wilson states she first became aware of this action and lawsuit only after Defendant JLIG received the clerks entry of default in the mail which would have been after the process servers mailing date of September 15, 2023 but this declaration is disproven by her September 11, 2023 email which admits she was knowledgeable about the lawsuit. The Court finds there was no attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect here and Defendant cannot seek relief under section 473(b). Third, Defendant argues public policy favors setting aside default and allowing Defendant to answer. Defendants motion, and the Welch Declaration, state that a copy of JLIGs proposed answer to Plaintiffs complaint is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Welch Declaration. The Court sees there is no such attachment of the proposed answer in the Welch Declaration, nor on file with the Court at all. Further, the motion is untimely. Defendants reply argues the motion is timely because it is seeking mandatory relief, not discretionary relief. When a complying affidavit is filed, relief is mandatory, even if the attorneys neglect was inexcusable. Rodrigues v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033. However, relief may be denied if the court finds the default was not in fact the attorneys fault, e.g., when the attorney is simply covering up for the clients neglect. Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 816, 821. Similarly, where a party inexcusably allows default to be entered and then afterwards hires an attorney, the provision does not apply because the default must in fact be caused by the attorneys mistake. Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 908, 910912. Here, the Court observes that it was undisputed that default was entered against JLIG on October 26, 2023. However, the Wilson Declarations only attempt at explaining attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect is that she first became aware of the action and suit after JLIG received the entry of default in the mail (Wilson Decl. ¶ 3), and she believed the lawsuit could be resolved through early settlement and her mistaken belief is why JLIG did not move to quash summons or request to set aside default until now. (Wilson Decl. ¶ 4.) Although the Court has already determined that Wilsons email message establishes her knowledge of the suit before the defaultassuming arguendo that her declaration is true and she was not aware of the suit until she received the clerks entry of default in the mail, then attorney error could not possibly have caused the default in this case. Thus, the Court determines that mandatory relief is unavailable to JLIG. Based on the above, Defendant has not demonstrated entitlement to the requested relief. Therefore, the motion is DENIED. CONCLUSION JL Investment Group, Inc.s motion to set aside the default is DENIED. Moving Party to provide notice. Dated: August 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Ruling

Gordon Panzak vs. City of Fowler

Aug 28, 2024 |23CECG03031

Re: Panzak v. City of Fowler Case No. 23CECG03031Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike ComplaintTentative Ruling: To continue the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike to October 16, 2024at 3:30 p.m. in Department 503. To order plaintiff to meet and confer with defensecounsel. If the parties are unable to resolve their dispute, then plaintiff’s counsel shall filea declaration regarding the meet and confer efforts by the close of business on October2, 2024.Explanation: Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, “[b]efore filing a motion to strikepursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone,or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motionto strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolvesthe objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) “The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration statingeither of the following: [¶] (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferredwith the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike, and that the partiesdid not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by the motion to strike. [¶](B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike failed to respondto the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet andconfer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) However, “[a]determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall notbe grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) Section 430.41 contains similar meet and confer requirements before filing ademurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) Again, however, failure to meet andconfer is not a valid ground for denying a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subs.(a)(4).) Here, defense counsel states that he sent a written meet and confer letter toplaintiff on May 14, 2024, stating his issues with the complaint and asking plaintiff tocontact him or his office to arrange a meet and confer session by phone. (May 15, 2024Walls decl., ¶ 3.) He received no response to the letter, and was not able to set aconference for the meet and confer session. (Ibid.) He also attempted to meet andconfer with plaintiff by phone, but was unable to reach him, as the phone numberprovided by plaintiff is a business called Coffee Break, and plaintiff is not an employee ofthe business, although he apparently receives mail there. (June 17, 2024 Walls decl., ¶4.) Defense counsel also states that plaintiff has still not responded to his prior meet andconfer letter. (Ibid.) On the other hand, plaintiff claims that defense counsel never attempted to callhim, text him, or leave a voicemail for him on his phone, so he contends that defendantshave not adequately met and conferred before filing their demurrer and motion to strike.In the reply, defense counsel appears to concede that he might have called the wrongnumber for plaintiff, but still contends that plaintiff should have responded to his meetand confer letter, and that it would be futile to require further meet and confer effortsbefore ruling on the merits of the demurrer. However, it is defendant’s burden as the moving party to make a good faith effortto meet and confer by in person, by phone, or by video conference. (Code Civ. Proc.,§§ 430.41, subd. (a); 435.5, subd. (a).) Thus, simply sending a letter to plaintiff beforemeeting and conferring was not enough to satisfy the meet and confer requirement.Also, while defense counsel later attempted to call plaintiff to discuss the matter, heapparently called the wrong number and never spoke with plaintiff. Thus, defendantsnever complied with the meet and confer requirements of sections 430.41 and 435.5. Asa result, the court will not consider the merits of the demurrer and motion to strike at thistime. On the other hand, the court cannot simply overrule the demurrer or deny themotion to strike based on the failure to meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41,subd. (a)(4); 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) Instead, the court intends to continue the matter forseveral weeks and order defense counsel to meet and confer by phone, videoconference, or in person with plaintiff before the next hearing date. If the meet andconfer fails to resolve the dispute, then counsel shall file a new declaration regarding themeet and confer efforts before the next hearing. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 8/26/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

ORIAN vs ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUI

Aug 29, 2024 |RIC1810028

ORIAN VS ALL PERSONS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTRIC1810028 UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY ON 1ST AMENDED CROSS-LEGAL COMPLAINT OF LUIS GARCIATentative Ruling:The Motion for Summary Judgment as against Cross-Defendant A. Pathak is granted for reasonCross-Complainants have met the initial burden of producing evidence on each element of everycause of action justifying a summary judgment as to the entire action. Once the burden shifted,A. Pathak failed to meet his burden of producing controverting evidence raising a triable issue offacts as to any cause of action.Cross-Complainants’ Requests for Judicial Notice:Nos. 2-38: is granted only as to “the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document wasrecorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and thedocument’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding thedocument’s authenticity”; and “from this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect ofthe recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank,N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265, disapproved on other grounds by Yvanova v. New CenturyMortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919; see Poseidon Development, Inc. Woodland Lane Estates,LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1118 [judicial notice properly taken of the legal effect ofassignment of deed of trust].)Nos. 1, 39-52: is granted only to extent these documents exist as part of record or file of a courtin this state or the United States and should not be accepted as true matters stated, unless thematters are indisputably true. (Evid. Code, §452(d) [judicial notice may be taken of records of anycourt of this state or United States]; See Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1569; also see Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97.)Cross-Complainants’ evidentiary objectionSustained.

Ruling

Angeles Contractor, Inc., et al vs Santa Cruz Hotel, L.P, et al

Aug 30, 2024 |20CV01281

20CV01281ANGELES CONTRACTOR INC. v. SANTA CRUZ HOTEL LP CROSS-DEFENDANT ANGELES CONTRACTOR’S DEMURRER TO SANTA CRUZ HOTEL’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT The demurrer is overruled. Page 1 of 2 Cross-defendant Angeles Contractor argues that Santa Cruz Hotel’s Third AmendedComplaint (TAC) fails to state facts to support these the causes of action for negligence, fraudand negligent misrepresentation and that these claims are barred by California law. However, Santa Cruz Hotel has pled facts indicating that an independent duty of careexists outside the contract for negligence (causing property damage). (TAC ¶¶ 72-79.) Further,Santa Cruz Hotel now specifically alleges the parties, their statements, and sufficient detailsrelated to their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it wassaid or written for supporting its causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation (TAC¶¶ 93-123.) (Kalnoki v. First Am. Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 35.) Angeles Contractor’s arguments go to the merits of the causes of action. At this point inthis four-year-old case, the pleadings in this matter must be set so the parties can proceed to trythis case on its merits. Angeles Contractor’s Request for Judicial Notice: Exhibits A and B: Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, Notice of Entry of Stipulated FinalJudgment in People v. Santa Cruz Hotel, LP, Santa Cruz Superior No. 19CV02338: Granted.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

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